Researchers have used cross-state differences to assess the jobs impact of the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (the Recovery Act). Existing studies find that the Act's broadlydirected spending (i.e. excluding tax cuts) increased employment, at a cost-per-job of roughly three to five times that of typical employment compensation in the U.S. Other research finds that a particular component of the Act-emergency Medicaid grants to states-created jobs at a cost of 12% to 20% that of broadly-directed spending. This paper shows that these differences across the components' impacts can be explained by omitted variables in the existing work on the emergency Medicaid grants. Adjusting for the omissions, the jobs effect of the Act's Medicaid grants becomes substantially weaker. The omissions are: (i) not controlling the degree of (non-Recovery Act) federal dependency, (ii) not duly controlling for pre-Act housing and labor market conditions, and (iii) not conditioning on Recovery Act funding beyond that from the Act's Medicaid grants. Adjusting for any one of these omissions, by itself, results in a substantial increase in the cost of job creation and/or no statistically significant jobs effect.
Introduction
importance going forward.
In this paper, I show the differences across the estimated jobs effect can be explained by differences in econometric specifications, without appealing to differences regarding the programs' actual impact on the economy. I show that the research on emergency Medicaid grants does not include conditioning information included in the work on broadly-directed spending. Adjusting for the omissions, the jobs effect of the Act's Medicaid grants becomes substantially weaker.
The omissions are: (i) not controlling the degree of (non-Recovery Act) federal dependency, (ii) not duly controlling for pre-Act housing and labor market conditions, and (iii) not conditioning on Recovery Act funding beyond the Medicaid grants. Adjusting for any one of these omissions, by itself, results in a substantial increase in the (point estimate) cost of job creation and/or no statistically significant jobs effect. spending. The uppermost horizontal line (square endpoints) is the 90% confidence interval for this value under the baseline specification when the treatment variable is the Act's emergency Medicaid 6 An earlier line of work, Gramlich (1978) and Gramlich (1979) , found weak short-run effects on economic activity of state fiscal stabilization support from the federal government.
7 Under this scenario, there would presumably be diminishing returns to using state grants; thus, one would not administer the entirety of the Recovery Act funds through these types of state grants.
grants to states. The point estimate, equal to -7.3, lies at the midpoint of the interval. It implies that $1 million of emergency Medicaid grants reduced employment by 7.3 job-years. Note that this horizontal line crosses the zero value, implying that one cannot reject the hypothesis of no jobs effect (90% confidence level).
For comparison, the thick vertical line marks the number of job-years based on the typical U.S. compensation (described above). It is roughly 25 (= $1,000,000/$40,000) jobs. The 90% confidence interval for the emergency Medicaid spending lies entirely to the left of this line, implying job creation from this component of the Act, even taking into account statistical imprecision, was more costly than job creation in the economy overall.
Next, the diamond-endpoint line shows the corresponding interval from the baseline specification when the treatment variable is broadly-directed spending. The point estimate is positive and thus, by itself, consistent with a positive jobs effect. It implies a relatively high cost per job-year: $238,000. As with the Act's Medicaid component, one cannot reject a zero jobs effect at a 90% confidence level. In the next section, I describe aspects of the Recovery Act and the relevant existing research.
In Section 3, I describe the data and the econometric model. In Section 4, I report estimates that establish my paper's main findings. Section 5 provides additional estimates of alternative specifications that expand upon my main finding. Section 6 concludes.
Background on the Recovery Act and Existing Research
The Recovery Act was exceptional both in its price tag ($830 billion) as well as the broad portfolio of its components. The wide coverage across sectors of the economy can be seen by looking at the breadth of agencies that administered the Act's funds: from the Department of Transportation to the Environmental Protection Agency to NASA to the Department of Justice. Each of these agencies, along with 16 others distributed at least $1 billion of Recovery Act funds.
Much of the discussion among proponents of the Act has centered on whether the program's spending component was sufficiently large. There is a dearth of consideration by scholars on whether the spending mix across categories was appropriate. Along those lines, I note that the designers of the legislation received little input from economists employed by then President-elect Obama in drafting the Act. This was perhaps in part because little research exists on which types of government spending are most effective.
In his book on the Act and its impact, Grabell (2012) writes "Senator Mel Martinez was Table 1 , column (i)
Job-years per $1 million (based on 2009 U.S. typical compensation)
Broadly-directed spending, Table 3 , column (i)
Council of Economic Advisors Projection
Notes: Broadly-directed spending is Recovery Act dollars obligated by federal agencies/departments (excluding the Dept. of Labor) through Dec. 2010. The job-years impact is measured using employment between Jan. 2009 and Dec. 2010 . The Council of Economic Advisers (2009b number is based on the Council's projection that each $92,000 of the Act's spending would increase employment by one job-year.
struck by the lack of involvement from the [Obama economic] transition team in crafting the bill." My paper partially fills this gap in understanding, and hopefully better informs policymakers, by conducting a cross-study comparison of the jobs effect of alternative components of the Act. Conley and Dupor (2013) , using cross-sectional IV, find that during its first two years, the Recovery Act's spending component increased employment at a cost of $202,000 per job-year.
Conley and I use two instruments: the federal Department of Transportation dollars allocated as part of the Recovery Act and the extent to which states used inelastic revenue sources to finance expenditures. The transportation instrument is based on the fact that the Recovery Act's highway dollars were assigned based on formulary factors. I do not use the inelastic-revenue instrument in this paper, in order to keep my analysis of the various papers highly comparable. 8
The Wilson (2012) study also uses cross-sectional IV to analyze the employment effects of the Recovery Act. Wilson (2012) also recognizes that much of the Act's aid was assigned via formulary factors. He constructed three instruments, each of which is based on formulary factors used by a federal department to administer Recovery Act funds. These are the Departments of Education, Transportation and Health and Human Services. These formulas were based on pre-Act factors and thus should be orthogonal to post-enactment employment outcomes. Wilson (2012) reports that "Cross-state IV results indicate that ARRA spending in its first year yielded about eight jobs per $1 million spent, or $125,000 per job." 9 The results in Conley and Dupor (2013) and Wilson (2012) are broadly in line with the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimate, which uses a different methodology. 10 The Congressional Budget Office (various quarterly reports), in a series of reports, uses a "historical multiplier" approach to calculate a hi-low range of estimates for the jobs effect, as opposed to instrumental variables. The CBO reports imply that employment increased during the Act's first two years at a cost of between $133,000 and $666,000
per job-year. 11 The CBO's upper bound on the cost per job is high because its calculations include the Recovery Act tax cuts as well as its spending, along with the Office's supposition that tax cuts have multipliers that are lower than those of spending.
To put the above numbers in context, I note that the typical U.S. full-time worker earns roughly $40,000. 12 Thus, the cross-sectional studies find that the Recovery Act spending component in-creased jobs at a cost of between three and five times the cost of employing a worker in the U.S.
According to the CBO, Recovery Act tax cuts plus spending increased employment at three times the typical cost of employing a worker as a lower bound.
Econometric Specification
Outcome variable (∆ Job-years)
The outcome variable for each state is built up from total nonfarm employment from the seasonally-adjusted Bureau of Labor Statistics establishment survey. Let Y j,t be the total employment of state j in month t. The outcome variable is the change in employment from December 
where ∆ denotes "change in."The (1/12) term appears to transform the variable from job-months to job-years. I also scale by each state's population Pop j .
The use of job-years follows Conley and Dupor (2013) and Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012) . Using 
Treatment variable (S)
I consider two treatment variables: broadly-directed Recovery Act spending and Recovery Act state Medicaid grants. 13 Each is scaled by the state population and measured as cumulative amounts through December 2010. 14 Next, I must decide on exactly what point in the spending chain that the Act's dollars constitute the treatment variable. A few alternatives are: when money is paid out to recipients (i.e.
"outlays" by the federal government), when money is committed by the federal government to recipients (i.e. "obligations") or when potential recipients gain the ability to apply for monies (i.e. "announcements" as described in Wilson (2012) ).
for roughly 70% of total compensation. Thus, wages and benefits totaled $23.24 per hour. According to the Current Employment Statistics survey, the average weekly hours of all private employees was 34.2. Given a 50 work-week year, the typical annual employment compensation equaled $39,740 in 2010.
13 Following Wilson (2012) and Conley and Dupor (2013) , broadly-directed spending excludes dollars administered by the U.S. Department of Labor. These dollars were primarily for funding state extensions of unemployment insurance benefits. Because these have a direct negative labor supply effect, it is sensible to treat these funds differently. See Hagerdorn et al. (2013) and Mulligan (2012) on the impact of these benefits during and following the 2008-9 recession.
14 For the broadly-directed spending, I remove one grant to the District of Columbia from the obligations data. This was a $1.3 billion discretionary grant ($2,170 per capita) to Amtrak. While Amtrak's administrative office is located in the District, most of the spending would be spread across the U.S.
I use obligated dollars as the treatment variable for both the broadly-directed and Medicaid spending regressions. Wilson (2012) Although he reports estimates for each of the three alternative treatments, he chooses announcements for his baseline specification. If outlays (or obligations) are roughly proportional to announcements, then using one of the first two as the treatment variable, will lead to an understatement of the cost of the Recovery Act intervention if anticipation effects are important. This could in turn lead to an overstatement of the jobs effect of the Act.
Conditioning Variables (X)
I draw conditioning variables from the existing research on the Recovery Act. First, as shown in Conley and Dupor (2013) , it is crucial to control for labor and housing market conditions before the In some specifications, I remove the four market controls and add three different controls. The three different controls, used in Wilson (2012) , are: the Recovery Act tax benefits (p.c.), a 3-year moving average of pre-recession personal income (p.c.) and the change in employment (p.c.) between Dec. 2007 and Feb. 2009 .
Instruments (Z)
For most of the paper, I use four instruments. The first three instruments are adopted directly from Wilson (2012) . 17 Each instrument is based on formulary allocation factors used to divvy various components of the Recovery Act dollars across states.
Each of the three instruments corresponds to the formulary factor The ED instrument is based on the Act's requirement that each state was allocated dollars according to its school-age population along with its total population. In turn, the per capita Recovery Act education aid would be higher in states with a larger school-age population share.
This share is used as the second instrument in his study. The statistical model is thus
∆Job-years j = βŜ j + γX j + ε j : Second-stage whereŜ j are the fitted values from the first-stage regression. The parameter of interest is β.
4 Results: The Recovery Act's Cost of Job Creation from the sample because it is a simple way to control for the degree of federal dependency across observations; the District is by far the most federally dependent of the observations.
In the baseline specification, the first-stage results show that the t-statistic against the null of a zero coefficient on the Medicaid instrument equals 10.8 and the partial F -statistic equals 115.
Thus, the instrument is a strong one. Also, examining these two statistics across the six columns in the table, the instrument is strong in each specification.
The second stage of the baseline specification finds that the coefficient on emergency Medicaid grants equals -7.3 (SE = 11.7). Thus, $1 million of additional Recovery Act Medicaid grants has the effect of reducing employment by 7.7 job-years over the first two years following the Act's passage, according to the point estimate. Note that this coefficient is not statistically different from zero at any conventional confidence level; therefore, one cannot reject a zero jobs effect of the emergency Medicaid grants.
Moving to the conditioning variables, note that three of the pre-Act market variables are statistically different from zero at a 99% confidence level. The coefficients on the first and second lags of employment are positive and negative (respectively). The positive first-lag coefficient is consistent with an inertial labor market during the downturn. The negative second-lag coefficient may be due to the fact that, two years prior to the Act's passage, employment in many states was growing much faster than trend. Overhiring in relatively booming states may have caused sharper employment declines later during the recession. Not surprisingly, the estimate on pre-Act house price growth
shows that an initially weak housing market was associated with a future weak labor market. The remaining baseline conditioning variables also have some explanatory power.
While the baseline specification (column (i)) fails to reject a zero jobs effect, the table's remaining columns show a sequence of modifications capable of delivering a strong positive jobs effect.
Column (ii) of Table 1 (SE = 11.33). Note that the effect is still not statistically different from zero. The point estimate implies that the program increased employment at a cost of $255,000 per job-year. This is within the same range as the Conley and Dupor (2013) estimate that broadly-directed spending increased employment at a cost of $202 thousand per job-year. This is the first main finding of my paper:
not duly controlling for pre-Act labor and housing market significantly increases the treatment effect of Recovery Act Medicaid grants.
The removal of pre-Act market variables is critical in moving the baseline specification closer to that of Council of Economic Advisers (2009a) and Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012) . In those papers, there is no housing market control variable and only one labor market control: a shorter (i.e.
7-month) change in employment preceding the Act.
Not including the pre-Act market variables, by itself, does not result in a statistically significant or highly cost-effective job creation (column (ii) of Table 1 (2013) and Wilson (2012) do not. Without these fixed effects, the employment effect is not statistically different from zero. Table 2 contains the least-squares version of the 2SLS estimates presented in Table 1 . Comparing the results in the two tables may provide us a sense of the bias that would result from the endogeneity.
In four of the six specifications (columns (i), (iii), (iv) and (v)), the 2SLS coefficient (see Table   1 ) on Medicaid aid is somewhat greater than the corresponding least-squares coefficient (see Table   2 ). This is consistent with the direction of bias that intuition might suggest: relatively greater aid went to states that faced worse economic conditions; thus, independent of the assignment of aid, the initially worse-off states are likely to have worse labor market outcomes following the Act's passage.
Thus, not controlling for the endogeneity might lead to a treatment effect that is downward-biased.
Next, Table 3 contains the second-stage results for broadly-directed Recovery Act spending.
The two changes in specifications relative to the results in Table 1 and DOT instruments are statistically significant predictors (90% confidence level or greater) of the endogenous variable. The ED coefficient has a t-statistic that is less than 1.6 each specification.
Column (i) of Table 3 contains the baseline specification for broadly-directed spending. As with Medicaid spending, it includes the four pre-Act market variables as well as the sample of 50 states.
The coefficient on broadly-direct spending equals 4.2 (SE = 7.9). This implies a cost per job-year equal to $240 thousand, according to the point estimate. This is similar in magnitude to the $202 thousand value reported as the benchmark specification in Conley and Dupor (2013) . Note the coefficient in column (i) is estimated with significant imprecision.
Next, column (ii) differs from column (i) in that I remove the four pre-Act market variables and replace them with the adjusted controls. The point estimate implies a cost per job-year equal to $133 thousand. Also, one can reject the hypothesis that there is no job-year response to broadlydirected aid at a 90% level.
Next, column (iii) uses the adjusted controls and further adds the District of Columbia to the sample. Adding DC results in an increased coefficient and greater precision relative to column (ii).
The point estimate is 13.2 and statistically different from zero at the 99% level. Thus, the effect of adding DC to either the broadly-directed spending regression or the emergency Medicaid grant regressions is to increase the jobs effect estimate; however, the magnitude of the increase (and thus potential bias introduced) is much larger in the emergency Medicaid case. Columns (iv) through (vi) of Table 3 are included for completeness. Table 4 contains the least-squares estimates corresponding to the 2SLS specifications presented in Table 3 .
For robustness, I also estimate the model using the obligations treatment and job-years outcome variable through Dec. 2011 rather than Dec. 2010. The results are reported in the Appendix. The qualitative message is unchanged. First, for both the emergency Medicaid grants and broadlydirected spending, the baseline specifications (modified only to extend the horizon through 2011)
show no statistically significant jobs effect. Second, adjusting the specifications sequentially by changing the controls drives up the magnitude of the estimated jobs effect.
I described above how a large low cost-per-job estimate was driven in part by the inclusion of DC. This sensitivity has a simple explanation. The District of Columbia received a great deal of Recovery Act aid, and in particular, Recovery Act Medicaid aid. Since its inception, the 50 state governments participate in a cost-sharing program with the federal government for the financial burden of the Medicaid program. Since DC is not a state, it relies disproportionately on the federal government for these expenses (DC Fiscal Policy Institute (2012)).
In addition, the District holds a special place as the center of the federal government. Next, rather than dropping the District from the sample, I estimate the 51 observation sample using two alternative conditioning variables that reflect federal dependency. The first conditioning variable is the share of employment in the federal government.
Columns (i) and (ii) of Table 5 , report the first-and second-stage estimates when I include the share of federal employment as a regressor. 23 The jobs effect estimate is -3.9 (SE = 13.0) and not significantly different from zero.
23 The other conditioning variables are identical to those of the baseline specification. They are included in the first-and second-stage regressions but not reported in the table in order to conserve on space. Columns (iii) and (iv) report the jobs effect using this variable. One million dollars of additional emergency Medicaid aid results in 6.9 fewer job-years in the first two years following passage, according to the point estimate. The jobs effect is not statistically different from zero.
While the Act's emergency Medicaid grants and the measures of federal dependency are related, they are only somewhat correlated. For example, the correlation between the emergency Medicaid grants (p.c.) and the Tax Foundation variable is 0.3. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the measures of federal dependency are "picking up" the effect of the Medicaid grants rather than having direct effects on their own. Arguing for that scenario would be tantamount to claiming, for example, that the Medicaid grants were responsible for the relatively strong employment outcome in DC rather than the fact that one-third of workers in DC were employed in government. This establishes my second main finding: not controlling for the degree of federal dependency eliminates a statistically significant jobs effect of the Recovery Act's emergency Medicaid grant program.
Additional Results

The Recovery Act and "Cocktail Therapies"
The term "cocktail therapy" is used in the medical field to describe a mixture of drugs used to treat a particular condition. The term is commonly associated with a triple-drug combination [or regimen] used to treat AIDS. The cocktail is composed of azidothymidine (AZT), a reverse transcriptase inhibitor (RTI), and a protease inhibitor. Similarly, the $830 billion Recovery Act was a cocktail therapy containing many components, of which emergency Medicaid grants made up roughly 10%.
In the AIDS drug case, suppose that: (i) in randomize trials, persons assigned to the treatment group are given the entire cocktail as opposed to one of its components, such as AZT; and then
(ii) scientists conclude that the effect of the entire cocktail was due only to AZT. If the trial were to be successful, then scientists might conclude that it is sufficient to prescribe AZT without the other two.
This danger may arise if one analyzes the Act's emergency Medicaid grants while ignoring the other 90% of the fiscal policy intervention. See Figure 2 . The same factors that drove substantial emergency Medicaid aid also drove substantial broadly-directed aid. This is clear from Wilson (2012) , who shows that the formulary Medicaid instrument is highly correlated with broadlydirected spending. Also, Conley and Dupor (2013) show that many of the Recovery Act components were fungible. That is, state and local governments in effect could move dollars intended by federal lawmakers for one purpose to some different purpose. This means that the way in which dollars affected the economy might be independent of those dollars' intended purposes. 24
In Wilson (2012) and Conley and Dupor (2013) , the treatment variable is broadly-directed spending. Thus these papers are less likely to suffer from an omitted variable misspecification. For the research on the Act's Medicaid grants, not controlling for overall spending (net of the Medicaid grants) might lead to an understatement of the per job cost of increasing employment.
To assess the importance of omitting a substantial part of the treatment variable, I carry out the following exercise: estimate the emergency Medicaid spending regression except I include nonMedicaid Recovery Act spending as an additional endogenous regressor.
The new second-stage regression equation is: Note that each jobs effect parameter is estimated very imprecisely.
In panel (b) of 24 This phenomenon is closely related to work in public economics on the crowding out of grants to subnational governments (e.g. Bradford and Oates (1971) ).
25 These regressors are included in the specification but not reported in the paper to conserve on space. It is difficult to imagine a strategy for precisely isolating the effect of component of the treatment variable, emergency Medicaid grants, that make up only 10% of the overall Recovery Act fiscal intervention. Without assuming that the treatment effects have a particular relationship across spending components (such as identical effects, as in Wilson (2012) and Conley and Dupor (2013) ), it may be a Sisyphean endeavor.
Narrowing the Scope of My Comparison
To conduct a manageable comparison across studies, I have thus far made data and specification choices that drew from each of the studies. As such, my paper has thus far matched no single of these studies exactly. At this point, a reader may be concerned about whether the three crucial differences across studies that I have identified (i.e. federal dependency, pre-Act market conditions and non-Medicaid Recovery Act spending) are the actual one responsible for the non-robustness of the existing work on the Act's Medicaid grant component. Is it changes in these conditioning variables that drive the change in the estimated jobs effect, or possibly some other differences in specifications? Potential candidates might be: the choice of obligations instead of outlays as the treatment variable, or the selection of start and end months for the change in employment outcome variable.
To allay this potential concern, in this section I recast my analysis using as a starting point explicitly the benchmark specification in Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012) As explained previously, their sample includes the 50 states plus the District of Columbia.
Column (i) of my Table 7 The numbers in the comparable columns from Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012) and my Table 7 are identical up to two decimal places.
Next, I estimate the model with one additional control: the Federal spending per dollar of tax collected in each state (described earlier). Recall that this is one measure of federal dependency.
The estimated job-years per $1 million spent drops to 2.82 (SE = 9.0), as seen in column (ii) of my Table 7 . Thus, one change to the benchmark specification in Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012) eliminates a significant jobs effect both statistically and quantitatively. Column (ii) also show Notes: This figure is constructed using statistics from Table 7 . "CFLW" refers to Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012). that the R 2 increases substantially-from 0.69 to 0.80-with the inclusion of the federal dependency measure, and also the coefficient on federal dependency is significantly different from zero at a 99% confidence level. Thus, this single specification change leads the cost per job, with respect to point estimates, to increase from $35,200 to $439,000.
Column (iii) reports the baseline specification from Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012) by nearly a factor of three relative to the baseline specification; moreover, the jobs effect is not statistically different from zero.
Finally, I include the four pre-Act market variables as well as the federal dependency measure (column (iv)). The coefficient equals -3.4 (SE = 6.4). The point estimate for this specification implies a negative jobs effect, and it is not statistically different from zero. Figure 3 depicts the jobs effect estimates in Table 7 . Each line represents the 90% confidence interval for one of the estimates. The numerical value of the point estimate is reported above the corresponding confidence interval. Recapping, the finding of a strong jobs effect of the Act's Medicaid program is not robust to alternative and sound changes in conditioning variables. These changes, and not other aspects of the econometric specification, are sufficient to establish this non-robustness.
As one additional robustness check, I estimated the baseline specification of Table 7 with the original controls, i.e. column (i), except that I dropped the District of Columbia. This is an alternative way to partially control for federal dependency. There is a large, but less dramatic, decline in the point estimate of the jobs effect. It equals 16.6 (S.E. = 9.2). While the estimate is statistically different from zero at a 90% confidence interval, it is very imprecise. The corresponding 90% confidence interval for the cost per job equals ($31,500 , $682,000).
Conclusion
Four final comments are in order.
Work on the Recovery Act's effectiveness as a macro stabilization tool is far from complete.
Nonetheless, an emerging body of research is demonstrating that the Act had either little effect on economic activity or else came at a high price tag. 27 In this paper, I reconcile the existing work on the Act's overall spending based on cross-state evidence with the findings of other researchers that the Act's Medicaid grants had a powerful, positive jobs effect. I have shown that the results for the Medicaid grants can be explained by econometric differences across studies, without appealing to differences across how the programs actually impacted the economy. In light of this reconciliation, it appears that the Act's emergency Medicaid grants were approximately as effective or even less effective than the Act's broadly-directed spending.
Second, the importance of the degree of federal dependency as an explanatory variable for employment outcomes shown in this paper bears repeating. The District was largely unaffected by the recession. The business of the District is government, and that business remained good throughout the period considered. The finding that the government did relatively well in the Recovery Act episode is echoed by other studies. Dupor (2012) reports that over 75% of the directly created and saved jobs, as a result of the Act, were in government. Also, Conley and Dupor (2013) found that the spending component of the Act had a statistically significant positive effect on government employment, whereas there was no such effect on the private sector.
Third, this paper as well as the existing studies compared here use a methodology that cannot identify some potential mechanisms for spending to influence employment. These are spillovers: employment increases in one state because of spending, but not because of spending within that state's borders. One such mechanism is the expected inflation channel. Greater government spending in Iowa has an effect nationwide on expected inflation. This in itself will tend to increase consumption in other states, such as Georgia, through a fall in the real interest rate, even if Georgia were to receive no stimulus dollars at all.
Consider taxes as a second potential spillover. If Recovery Act spending signaled higher future tax rates, especially on capital, then this could have reduced economic activity upon news/passage of the Act. Exploring the magnitude by which higher expected future taxes rates might have reduced private activity during the Recovery Act episode merits future research.
Fourth, my paper is not intended as an indictment of the Act. Job creation was not its only goal. Programs, such as highway construction and energy sector subsidies, could serve to increase the economy's productivity and environmental quality in the long run. How well and how cost effectively these components of the Act will achieve these goals and beyond the scope of this paper.
Also, funding and expanding the social safety net through several of the Act's components, such as its extension of unemployment insurance benefits, may be valuable policy objectives for altruistic reasons. The Council's stated goal was to minimize discrepancies across agencies and reduce the agencies' resources required to conduct their own analyses. These instructions to federal agencies appears on page 5:
In estimating the job-years created by direct government spending, agencies will be asked to use the simple rule that $92,000 creates one job-year. This procedure is somewhat crude and does not take into account the obvious differences in wages and other costs across different types of projects and across different parts of the country. It does, however, take into account the key difference between tax changes or state fiscal relief, and direct government investment spending. The rule's key virtue is its simplicity and conservatism. Because it is derived to be consistent with the macroeconomic jobs estimates, it minimizes discrepancies between the aggregate jobs estimates and those agency by agency. Also, since the main focus of the agencies will be on actual reporting of jobs created and retained, this simple procedure minimizes the resources devoted to the early job estimation.
Note that this $92,000 number was intended (by the Council) to reflect the combined impact of the spending on direct jobs, indirect jobs and induced jobs. Notes: Each regression includes a constant.
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